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Ram C. Sekar†, John E. Parsons*, Howard J. Herzog‡ and Henry D. Jacoby+
Abstract
This paper assesses the role of uncertainty over future U.S. carbon regulations in shaping the current choice of
which type of power plant to build. The pulverized coal technology (PC) still offer the lowest cost power— assuming
there is no need to control emissions of carbon. The integrated coal gasification combined cycle technology (IGCC)
may be cheaper if carbon must be captured. Since a plant built now will be operated for many years, and since
carbon regulations may be instituted in the future, a U.S. electric utility must make the current investment decision
in light of the uncertain future regulatory rules. This paper shows how this decision is to be made. We start by
describing the economics of the two key coal-fired power plant technologies, PC and IGCC. We then analyze the
potential costs of future carbon regulations, including the costs of retrofitting the plant with carbon capture
technology and the potential cost of paying charges for emissions. We present the economics of each design in the
form of a cash flow spreadsheet yielding the present value cost, and show the results for different scenarios of
emissions regulation. We then discuss how to incorporate uncertainty about the future regulation of carbon
emissions into the decision to build one plant design or the other. As an aid to decision making, we provide some
useful benchmarks for possible future regulation and show how these benchmarks relate back to the relative costs of
the two technologies and the optimal choice for the power plant investment. Few of the scenarios widely referenced
in the public discussion warrant the choice of the IGCC technology. Instead, the PC technology remains the least
costly. The level of future regulation required to justify a current investment in the IGCC technology appears to be
very aggressive, if not out of the question. However, the current price placed on carbon emissions in the European
Trading System, is higher than these benchmarks. If it is any guide to possible future penalties for emissions in the
U.S., then current investment in the IGCC technology is warranted.
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1. Introduction
Electric power plants last a lifetime. The plants built today—and over the next ten years—will
be a substantial element of the fleet for a long time to come. And yet electric utilities responsible
for investing in new plants face an enormous uncertainty about which technology is most
economical. Updated versions of the traditional pulverized coal technology (PC) still offer the
lowest cost power—assuming there is no need to control emissions of carbon. But should control
be mandated sometime in the future, retrofitting these plants to capture the carbon is extremely
expensive and the economic equation is substantially altered. Newer technologies—notably
integrated coal gasification combined cycle (IGCC)—offer the prospect of more affordable
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2capture of the carbon. But the higher upfront investment cost can only be justified as a means to
avoid sizeable penalties for carbon emissions.
Currently the U.S. government does not mandate control of carbon emissions, so a naïve
economic calculation favors investment in PC plants. But the government has the power to
change the regulations in the future, either because the scientific evidence implicating carbon
emissions in dangerous levels of global warming becomes stronger or because the political winds
change and power shifts to those who feel the existing evidence is compelling enough. An
electric utility that makes its investment decision solely on the basis of today’s regulations may
find—if regulations change—that it has saddled itself with plants that must either be retrofitted at
high cost or that entail high charges for uncontrolled emissions. Of course, if carbon emissions in
the U.S. remain unregulated, today’s investment in a PC plant will be vindicated.
A wise investment decision today must be made with eyes wide open about the full range of
future conditions within which the plants might have to operate. How is this decision to be
made? What factors must be incorporated? Does the specter of future regulation of carbon argue
for construction of IGCC plants? Or is that specter too remote and too uncertain, so that current
investment should be in PC plants?
This paper is designed to answer these questions. We start by describing the economics of the
two key coal-fired power plant technologies, PC and IGCC. We then analyze the potential costs
of future carbon regulations, including the costs of retrofitting the plant with carbon capture
technology and the potential cost of paying charges for emissions. We present the economics of
each design in the form of a cash flow spreadsheet yielding the present value cost, and show the
results for different scenarios of emissions regulation. We then discuss how to incorporate
uncertainty about the future regulation of carbon emissions into the decision to build one plant
design or the other. As an aid to decision making, we provide some useful benchmarks for
possible future regulation and show how these benchmarks relate back to the relative costs of the
two technologies and the optimal choice for the power plant investment.
2. Cost and Performance of Alternative Power Plant Technologies—PC and IGCC With
And Without Carbon Capture
In order to make a consistent comparison between the two technologies, we compare total
capital, fuel, operating and carbon capture costs for a hypothetical power plant with 500 MW
capacity operating at a factor of 80%. For the PC plant we chose the sub-critical air-fired
technology. This is the most ubiquitous technology in the power plant fleet today. For CO2
capture at the PC plant we assume flue gas scrubbing using the MEA process. For CO2 capture at
the IGCC plant we assume scrubbing of shifted syngas using the Selexol process which results in
H2 being combusted in the gas turbine. We keep the total capacity constant both before and after
retrofit for carbon capture. Since retrofitting a given plant results in a decrease in electric output,
our comparison requires investment in additional capacity to keep the total capacity at 500 MW
and the costs of this additional capacity are factored into our estimates.1
                                                 
1 We use this single plant size purely for narrative convenience. Where sources describe a different optimal plant
size for a given technology, we have incorporated the unit costs—capital and operating—at this optimal plant
size, and simply adjusted it proportionally to yield a comparable 500 MW plant. Where retrofitting a given plant
requires installation of incremental capacity to bring the total back up to 500 MW, it would not be optimal to
3Table 1 shows our assumptions about the key technical and economic parameters for both of
the two technologies with and without carbon capture. We derived these assumptions based upon
a broad review of the literature, and, in particular, on the results reported in EPRI (2000) and the
National Coal Council (2004).2 Arguably the numbers in Table 1 present an optimistic
representation of the IGCC technology.
Without carbon capture, the two technologies differ primarily in up front capital costs: for the
PC technology the cost is $726 million, while for the IGCC technology it is $759 million. The
net heat rates for the two technologies are very close to one another—8,690 Btu/KWhe for the
PC technology and 8,630 Btu/KWhe for the IGCC technology. Consequently the fuel inputs
required in a year and the annual fuel costs for the two technologies are also very close—
30.4 million MMBtus and $45.7 million for the PC technology and 30.2 million MMBtus and
$45.4 million for the IGCC technology. The annual fuel cost is calculated assuming a coal price
of $1.50/MMBtu. The annual operating and maintenance (O&M) costs for the PC technology are
                                                                                                                                                              
actually expand capacity of the given retrofitted plant. The cheaper solution would be to makeup the lost
capacity through installation of new optimally sized plants. In doing our calculation of the cost of makeup
capacity, we assume this new construction of optimally sized units and simply allocate a portion of that cost to
the production of the constant 500 MW capacity for this plant.
2 Other sources include EPRI (2003), Rubin, Rao & Chen (2004), NETL-DOE (2002), Nsakala et al. (2003),
Gottlicher (2004) and McPherson (2004).
4less than for the IGCC technology—$26.3 million vs. $31.2 million, respectively. Finally, CO2
emissions for the PC plant are 0.774 ton/MWhe or 2.71 million ton/year vs. 0.769 t/MWhe or
2.69 million t/yr for the IGCC plant.
With carbon capture the PC technology has both higher capital costs and lower relative
performance than the IGCC technology. The total up front capital cost for the PC technology is
$1,258 million, while for the IGCC technology with carbon capture it is $987 million. With
carbon capture, the net heat rate for the PC is 12,193 Btu/KWhe while the net heat rate for the
IGCC is now 10,059 Btu/Kwhe. Therefore, the annual fuel cost for the PC is $64.1 million while
the annual fuel cost for the IGCC is $52.9 million. With carbon capture, the annual O&M costs
for the PC are $62.1 million vs. $51.0 million for the retrofitted IGCC. These figures include a
$5/t cost of transport and storage of the captured CO2, i.e., annual CO2 transport and storage
costs of $17.15 million and $14.15 million for PC and IGCC respectively. The residual CO2
emissions of the PC plant are 0.38 million t/yr vs. 0.31 million t/yr for the IGCC plant.
Another way to represent the costs of the different technologies is on a dollar per megawatt
hour basis—i.e., as levelized costs. We show these in Table 2. All costs are calculated assuming
constant output at 80% capacity over the 40 year life of the plant. These levelized costs are
calculated in real terms, i.e., without making any assumption about inflation. We use a real, risk-
adjusted discount rate of 6%.3 Costs are shown after-tax, using a 40% tax rate and with the value
                                                 
3 As a point of reference, a rate of 6% would be implied by a real risk-free rate of 2%, a risk premium of 6% and an
asset beta of 0.66. Assuming an inflation rate of 2.5% this is comparable to a nominal risk-adjusted discount rate
of 8.5%.
5of depreciation tax shields being allocated to the capital costs. We assume a constant
depreciation rate of 30% times the undepreciated capital account balance.4 Capital costs also
include the annual expense for insurance and property taxes, which equals 1.78% of the initial
capital investment. Without carbon capture, the PC technology produces power at a cost of
$40.0/MWh while the IGCC technology produces power at a cost of $42.3/MWh—5.7% more
than the cost of the PC. Carbon capture increases these costs to $69.7/MWh for the PC and
$56.3/MWh for the IGCC technology, so that the IGCC now costs 19% less. The cost of avoided
emissions is $44.6/t CO2 for the PC technology and $20.6/t CO2 for the IGCC technology.
If there is a discrepancy between the costs shown in Table 2 and the costs produced by others
and circulating in the literature, that discrepancy is likely to arise in the levelized capital cost
figure. This may arise due to either differences in ancillary cash flows associated with the capital
costs—e.g., various owner’s costs such as insurance and property taxes—or differences in the
discount rate, or differences in the term over which the costs are capitalized. We believe our
assumptions on the first two factors conform more or less to the assumptions others are making.
For example, the numbers in Table 2 are roughly consistent with those generated in the recently
published EPRI (2005) study on Financial Incentives for Deployment of IGCC—see their
Table II. The nominal discount rate they use is 7.35% given a 2% inflation rate—see their
Table XV—which is roughly comparable to our 6% real discount rate. In some cases, however,
other reports have used a shorter capitalization period of twenty to thirty years, where we use a
forty year capitalization period—see for example EPRI (2000) and the National Coal Council
(2004). So although we use these two studies to develop the data for Table 1, the resulting
levelized cost shown in Table 2 differs from what they report.
It is interesting to compare the cost differentials between the PC and the IGCC technology
displayed in Tables 1 and 2 to the size of the tax incentives recently created as a part of the
Energy Policy Act that was signed into law in August 2005. One feature of the legislation is a
potential tax credit for up to 20% of qualified investments in coal gasification projects. There is
no requirement that a qualifying IGCC plant include carbon capture. In our example of an IGCC
plant without carbon capture, if 20% of the total capital costs qualified for the tax credit, then
after netting out the foregone depreciation tax shields, this would lower the present value capital
investment cost of the technology by 13.8%. Since this cost is in turn nearly 50% of the total
levelized cost of electricity, this credit would lower the total levelized cost by between 6 to 7%.
This is just slightly more than the 5.7% total cost differential between the PC and the IGCC
technologies without carbon capture. Based on the cost figures used here, then, the tax incentives
in the Energy Policy Act push electric utilities just to the brink of choosing the IGCC design
whenever this would qualify—other factors being excluded.
                                                 
4 For costs such as fuel and O&M, using real cash flows allows us to avoid making any assumption about inflation.
However, depreciation is an inherently nominal account, and the expected rate of inflation affects the expected real
value of depreciation tax shields. We assume an expected inflation rate of 2.5%. We then calculate the expected
nominal value of the capital investment in a given year. This fixes the expected nominal value of the depreciation
in all future years. We then adjust the nominal depreciation schedule back to real terms by deflating the values.
63. Capitalizing the Costs of Future Carbon Regulations
The levelized cost figures shown in Table 2 assume that carbon capture begins from the first
moment of operation of the plant. The problem we want to examine is one in which the firm
begins operation of the plant without carbon capture, since that is not currently required in the
U.S., but subsequent regulations penalize carbon emissions and incentivize carbon capture. We
focus on the case in which the power plant is built in the year 2010 and begins operations in
2011, and new regulations penalize emissions from the fifth year of operation onward, i.e. from
2015. The company therefore has to choose in year 2014 or later whether or not to retrofit its
plant for carbon capture in order to avoid the penalty for carbon emissions. Although there are
many different types of regulatory schemes the government could employ, we limit our attention
to a simple charge or tax per unit of carbon emitted. This allows us to parameterize increasingly
strict regulations in the simplest manner possible.
We analyze this case in a few simple steps. First, we construct four cash flow tables
displaying the total annual cost of each technology, PC and IGCC, with and without carbon
capture. The costs shown are exclusive of any carbon emissions charges, which we account for
separately below. Second, we evaluate the present value cost of cumulative carbon emissions
charges over the life of the plant at various rates per ton of CO2 emitted. Finally, we evaluate the
decision whether and when to retrofit the plant, and calculate the total present value cost under
the optimal retrofit policy.
Tables 3 and 4 show the annual cash flows and net present value (NPV) of costs for the PC
and for the IGCC plants, respectively, without carbon capture. We assume that the up front
capital investment shown in Table 1 is made in a single lump sum at the start of the project,
which we set in the year 2010. The total present value cost of the PC plant is $1,267.3 million.
The total present value cost of the IGCC plant is $1,336.8 million. This is $69.6 million or about
5.5% more expensive. This calculation takes no account of the cost for possible future carbon
emission regulations or taxes.
Tables 5 and 6 show the annual cash flows and NPV of costs for the two technologies
assuming that the plants are retrofitted for carbon capture after 4 years of operation—i.e., at year
end 2014 and the start of 2015. We assume that the cost of retrofitting the plant is equal to the
difference between the cost of a plant with and without carbon capture as shown in Table 1—
$532.0 million for the PC vs. $228.0 million for the IGCC. This is obviously a lower bound on
the cost of retrofitting, and we make this assumption simply because most studies of the cost of
carbon capture only report the cost of a plant designed for capture from the start, and do not
estimate an explicit cost of retrofit.5
Depreciation bumps up in year 2015 reflecting the incremental depreciation for the second
installment of capital. Fuel costs and O&M costs both increase in 2015, but are constant at this
higher level thereafter. The total present value cost of the retrofitted PC plant is $2,000.4 million.
This is the value in 2010 anticipating the retrofitting at year end 2014 and the start of 2015. The
total present value cost of the retrofitted IGCC plant is $1,679.5 million.
                                                 
5 The exception is EPRI (2003).
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9Comparing the figures from Tables 3 and 5 we see that the incremental present value cost of
retrofitting the PC plant in year 2014 is $733.2 million. Comparing the figures from Tables 4 and
6 the incremental present value cost of retrofitting the IGCC plant in year 2014 is $342.6 million.
We now turn to accounting for the cost of carbon regulations under different scenarios. One
complication that needs to be taken into account is that the ultimate cost depends upon how the
plant owner responds to the regulations. The plant owner may respond to the imposition of a
carbon tax by either choosing to operate the plant as before and pay the carbon tax on the full level
of emissions, or retrofit the plant for carbon capture and pay the carbon tax on the reduced level
of emissions. Indeed, it can choose to pay the tax on emissions for a number of years and then
retrofit. It may make sense to do this if the initial tax rate is low, but the rate is expected to grow
over time. Assuming that the company maximizes its value, the actual cost of the regulation will
be the minimum cost across the company’s full range of options on whether and when to retrofit.
Table 7 shows the annual cash flow impact when a carbon tax is levied on emissions starting
in 2015, i.e., 5 years into the life of the project, and held constant for the remaining 35 years.
The PC plant’s annual CO2 emissions are 2.71 million t/yr, so every $1/t CO2 charged translates
into an annual cost of $2.71 million before tax and $1.63 million after-tax. The net present value
across the full 35 years of charges totals $18.83 million. Retrofitting the PC plant lowers CO2
emissions to 0.38 million t/yr, translating to a net present value for total emissions charges across
the full 35 years of $2.64 million—a savings of $16.19 million in net present value for every
$1/t charged. Since retrofitting the PC plant to lower emissions costs $733.2 million, a company
10
would choose to retrofit whenever the tax charged is $45.23/t CO2 or more.
6 The IGCC plant’s
CO2 emissions are 2.69 million t/yr, so every $1/t charged translates into an annual cost of
$2.69 million before tax and $1.61 million after-tax. The net present value across the full
35 years of charges totals $18.69 million. Retrofitting the IGCC plant lowers CO2 emissions to
0.31 million t/yr, translating to a net present value across the full 35 years of $2.15 million—a
savings of $16.54 million in net present value for every $1/t charged. Although these savings are
very close to the savings for the PC plant, since the cost of retrofitting the IGCC plant is so much
lower—$342.6 million—a company would choose to retrofit the IGCC plant at a much lower
level of carbon tax—i.e., whenever the tax charged is $20.72/t CO2 or more.
Figure 1 graphs the total net present value cost of both the PC and the IGCC technologies,
inclusive of the cost of CO2 emissions or emissions control, as a function of the level of carbon
tax levied. The graph for the PC starts at a cost of $1,267.3 million when no carbon tax is levied
and increases at the rate of $18.83 million for each $1/t CO2 tax. At a tax of $45.23/t
CO2—which is off the scale of the chart—the company chooses to retrofit, reducing the rate of
increase to $2.64 million for each $1/t CO2 tax. At a $35/t CO2 tax, the total cost of the PC plant
is $1,769.7 million. The graph for the IGCC starts at a cost of $1,336.8 million when no carbon
tax is levied and increases at the rate of $18.69 million for each $1/t CO2 tax. At a tax of $20.72/t
CO2, the company chooses to retrofit, reducing the annual CO2 emissions and therefore reducing
the rate of increase in the cost to $2.15 million for each $1/t CO2 tax. At a $35/t CO2 tax the total
cost for the IGCC plant is $1,574.0 million. The PC technology is cheaper so long as the tax
levied is less than $23.27/t CO2. If the tax is greater than $23.27/t CO2, the IGCC technology is
cheaper.
Figure 1. The net present value (NPV) of costs for PC and IGCC plants as a function of a carbon tax imposed in
the 5th year of operation and constant thereafter. (Costs are inclusive of emissions charges.)
                                                 
6 Since the emissions charge is assumed to be constant after it is initiated in 2015, there is no benefit to the company
from delaying a retrofit by a few years: it either makes sense to retrofit immediately, or not at all.
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Table 7 and Figure 1 were constructed on the assumption that the carbon tax rate is held
constant for the remaining life of the plant, i.e., between 2015 and 2050. What if the tax rate is
expected to grow over time? Facing a growing carbon tax, a company must decide not simply
whether to retrofit, but when to retrofit. Each year of delay of the retrofit saves the time value of
the investment cost and similarly pushes off by one year the incremental fuel and operating costs
that carbon capture imposes. But delay means paying that year’s level of the carbon tax on the
higher level of emissions. Once the cost of the carbon tax for the year equals the time value of
the retrofit investment it makes sense for the company to retrofit.
Figure 2 shows the marginal benefits and costs of delaying retrofit by one year at each year of
operation for the PC technology. The marginal benefits and costs shown for each year are valued
at that year, when the decision to retrofit or to delay is taken. These benefits and costs are not
discounted back to the start of the project. The figure assumes an initial carbon tax rate in 2015
of $20/t CO2 growing at 4% annually thereafter. As the figure shows, the marginal benefit of
delay is greater than marginal cost in the early years so that delaying retrofit makes sense. The
marginal benefit of delay is constant, while the marginal cost of delay is increasing as the carbon
tax rate increases. Consequently, it makes sense to retrofit in year 25 (2035).
Figure 3 shows the marginal benefit and marginal cost for the IGCC technology. The
marginal benefit of delay is always less than the marginal cost, so that it is optimal to retrofit as
soon as the tax is imposed, in year 5 (2015). If one considers a different initial carbon tax rate,
Figure 2. Marginal benefit and marginal cost of delaying retrofit of a PC plant by one year. Assumes an initial
carbon tax of $20/t CO2 growing at 4%/yr. Note: Unlike other values shown in this paper, which have all
been discounted back to year 0 of operation (calendar year 2010), the marginal benefit and marginal cost
are measured at the point the decision to delay is taken, i.e., to the year shown along the horizontal axis. So,
for example, in year 5 of operation (calendar year 2015), the marginal benefit of delaying retrofit is the time
value of postponing the investment one year. This is approximately the dollar amount of the investment,
plus the value of the depreciation tax shields discounted to this date,  times the discount rate. Since this is
approximately constant from year to year, the marginal benefit line is approximately constant. The reason
for speaking only approximately is that the real value of the tax shields does vary as time moves along. The
marginal cost of delaying retrofit is the amount of the incremental carbon tax incurred this year.
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Figure 3. Marginal benefit and marginal cost of delaying retrofit of an IGCC plant by one year. Assumes an
initial carbon tax of $20/t CO2 growing at 4%/yr. (See also Note in Figure 2.)
then the date chosen for retrofit changes; similarly, if one considers a different growth rate for
the tax, then the date chosen for retrofit also changes.7 In calculating the costs for a given
regulatory scenario, we incorporate the optimal choice of a retrofit date.
Figure 4 graphs the total net present value cost of both the PC and the IGCC technologies,
inclusive of the cost of CO2 emissions or emissions control, as a function of the initial level of
carbon tax levied, but assuming that the tax rate increases at 4% thereafter. As in Figure 1, the
graph for the PC starts at a cost of $1,267.3 million when no carbon tax is levied and therefore
the plant operates without carbon capture. At a low initial tax rate the plant is never retrofitted.
Figure 4. The NPV of costs for PC and IGCC plants as a function of a carbon tax imposed in the 5th year of
operation with a 4% growth rate thereafter. (Costs are inclusive of emissions charges.)
                                                 
7 These calculations assume that there is one known path of future regulation, so that the decision on timing the
retrofit can be easily evaluated. In reality, once an initial carbon tax is imposed, there remains uncertainty about
the future path. Our analysis abstracts from this uncertainty, but see Sekar (2005) for a methodology that
addresses it.
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However, as the rate is increased, it eventually becomes optimal for the plant to be retrofitted,
albeit late in its life. Because the plant is eventually retrofitted, the rate of increase in the cost per
$1/t CO2 tax begins to fall. Because the date of retrofit is earlier for higher initial tax rates, the
slope of the graph is non-linear in the initial carbon tax rate, declining gradually. Once the tax
rate reaches $35/t CO2 the total cost for the PC plant is $1,906.7 million. As in Figure 1, the
graph for the IGCC starts at a cost of $1,336.8 million when no carbon tax is levied. At lower
initial tax rates it becomes optimal to retrofit the IGCC plant, so that the slope of the line falls
sooner. At a $35/t CO2 tax rate the total cost for the IGCC plant is $1,626.6 million. The PC
technology is cheaper so long as the initial tax levied is less than $13.71/t CO2. If the tax is
greater than $13.71/t CO2, the IGCC technology is cheaper.
4. ‘Capture Ready’
One issue that has been raised in the public policy discussion surrounding the next generation
of power plants currently being constructed is the question of whether or not new plants should
be designed to be ‘capture ready’. Indeed, at their recent summit at Gleneagels, the leaders of the
G8 agreed to a plan of action on climate change that included working “to accelerate the
development and commercialization of Carbon Capture and Storage technology by…(c) inviting
the IEA to work with the CSLF to study definitions, costs, and scope for ‘capture ready’ plant
and consider economic incentives…”
In the most general sense, a ‘capture ready’ design involves some additional up front expense
in order to make it easier and less costly for a plant to be retrofitted at a later date for carbon
capture. This can be as simple as developing a PC plant with extra real estate where post
combustion capture equipment could be positioned should the plant eventually be retrofitted. Or
it could involve designing in extra capacity on the gasifier and the turbine of an IGCC plant for
optimal operation once the plant is retrofitted for capture.
These examples focus on minor variations on the architecture within the constraints of a pre-
specified plant design. But the choice between the two basic plant designs, PC and IGCC, should
also be seen as a ‘capture ready’ choice. The IGCC design is more expensive up front, but
making this up front investment lowers the expense of switching to carbon capture at a later date.
Indeed, we show that a firm that has chosen the IGCC design retrofits it for carbon capture at a
lower level of a carbon tax and at an earlier date than a firm that has chosen the PC design. The
calculus we present in this paper for choosing up front between the PC and the IGCC design is
exactly the calculus a company will undertake in evaluating investments in any ‘capture ready’
features for any fundamental design.
We believe the choice between the PC and the IGCC design should be the real focus of any
discussion of making power plants ‘capture ready’. We have examined elsewhere other types of
‘capture ready’ investments and whether the danger of future carbon regulations in the U.S.
justifies the costs—see Sekar (2005). Most other types of ‘capture ready’ expenses fall into one
of two categories. One category is those investments that involve relatively trivial cost, but also
make relatively minor impact on the ultimate cost of carbon capture. The incorporation of extra
space into PC plant designs belongs in this category. A second category is those investments that
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involve so great an initial cost that the costs of these investments are insufficiently
distinguishable from the cost of investing up front in full carbon capture itself. If the specter of
future carbon regulation would motivate these types of investments, then you have covered
substantial ground towards motivating full scale carbon capture. The overdesign of IGCC
components belongs in this category.8
5. The Initial Investment Decision—PC or IGCC
The basic tradeoff complicating an electric utility’s initial investment decision is clearly
illustrated in Figures 1 and 4. At a zero or low level of a tax the optimal power plant to construct
is the PC. On the other hand, if the path of future carbon taxes is flat, then for any tax above
$23.27/t CO2, the IGCC plant is optimal. If the tax rate is expected to grow over time at 4% per
year, then the switch point occurs at the lower initial tax rate of approximately $13.71/t CO2.
Clearly whether an electric utility should construct a plant using the PC technology or a plant
using the IGCC technology will depend upon the company’s expectation about the likelihood of
any future level of a carbon tax.
No one knows with certainty what level of carbon tax—if any—may be levied in the future.
A company will confront the range of possible outcomes like any decision under uncertainty, and
assign its best estimate of the probability of each scenario, averaging the results and determining
the power plant technology with the greatest expected value. In our case that means the plant
technology with the lowest possible cost inclusive of expected future carbon related costs,
whether those costs be in the form of emissions charges paid or capital expenditures for
retrofitting to capture carbon. If the company assigns high probability to the no carbon tax or to
the low carbon tax scenarios, then it makes sense for it to build PC plants. But if it assigns
sufficient probability to the higher carbon tax scenarios, then the value of the company will be
maximized by building the IGCC technology.
Complicating the problem is the wide range of possible paths of future regulation. New
regulations could be instituted in any given year, tax rates could be increased in some years but
not in others, and then increased again at a steeper rate. Regulations could be reversed or relaxed.
Fully encompassing all of these possibilities is a feasible, but technically difficult task—see
Sekar (2005) for a comprehensive solution. Our strategy here is to limit ourselves to a restricted
range of possibilities that nevertheless captures the essence of the problem and helps key
decision makers gain sufficient insight to address the issue under the widely varying
circumstances they may face.
Figure 5 shows a matrix of various possible initial tax rates and various possible growth rates
for the level of the tax. Consistent with the presentation above, we limit ourselves to future
scenarios in which a carbon tax is initiated in 2015 and grows at a constant rate thereafter. This
includes the special case of no future regulation, i.e., a $0/t tax rate, at least until 2050, the time
horizon considered for this plants operation. It also includes the case of a flat tax starting at some
rate in 2015 and staying constant through 2050.
                                                 
8 See Pre-investment IGCC design in EPRI (2003)
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Figure 5. Benchmark Future Carbon Tax Regimes vs. Optimal Technology Choice.
The solid line starting at the bottom of Figure 5 at a tax rate of nearly $25/t CO2 and growth
rate of 0% and sloping up and to the left to a tax rate of about $7.5/t CO2 and growth rate of 8%
divides the matrix into two areas. This line defines the switch point at which the expected cost of
an investment in a PC plant exactly equals the expected cost of an investment in an IGCC plant.
To the left and below this line the PC plant is less costly. To the right and above this line the
IGCC plant is less costly. Which plant is best to build depends upon the probability a company
places on all the different scenarios in the matrix and whether the weight of the probability lies
on one side or the other of the line.
To put this range of regulatory scenarios into perspective, we have also marked on the matrix
points corresponding to benchmarks that may help to calibrate the discussion about potential or
likely future carbon tax rates.
One type of benchmark maps various proposals that have actually been a part of the public
policy debate onto the different level of initial emissions charges and growth rates. Some of these
benchmarks are shown with the green squares in Figure 5.9 Perhaps the most widely discussed
proposal for regulation of carbon emissions in the U.S. has been the McCain-Lieberman
                                                 
9 We quote all figures here in terms that are comparable to the other numbers used in this paper—i.e., emissions
charges for 2015, denominated in 2003 dollars, and quoted as $/t CO2. Where figures quoted in the original
sources are benchmarked in different years, denominated in dollars quoted in a different year, or quoted as $/t C
instead of CO2, we show our calculations in the Appendix.
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proposal. Although the proposal failed in the U.S. Senate in 2003, it nevertheless garnered votes
from 43 of the 100 Senators and revised versions of the legislation continue to be considered.
There have been other serious proposals as well. Some that we have chosen to include in the
figure are:
• McCain-Lieberman. An analysis made by MIT researchers in the time leading up to the
2003 vote showed a cost of $10.82/t CO2 in 2015 growing at an annualized rate of 5.25%,
• The National Commission on Energy Policy (2004) proposed emissions caps that would
yield a price of $5.57/t CO2 in 2015 with a real annual growth rate of 3.4%,
• Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) analyzed an optimal policy involving an estimated compliance
cost of $4.1/t CO2 growing annually at a rate 2.34%,
• Barnes (2001) made an early recommendation for U.S. implementation of some sort of
Kyoto-like obligations, but with a safety valve on costs of approximately $7/t CO2 figure
in 2015; we assume a real annual growth rate of 2.34%,
• Kopp et al. (2001) is another early recommendation suggested as an alternative to a
quantity based target set by the Kyoto Protocol which corresponds to a compliance
payment of $16.2/t CO2; we assume a real annual growth rate of 2.34%.
Another type of benchmark simply identifies scenarios that other business people seem to be
focusing on as they evaluate this kind of decision under uncertainty. For example, a couple of
U.S. electric utilities have recently published their own consideration of the effect of possible
future regulation on their business—AEP and the Southern Co. These are show as the blue
squares in Figure 5.
A third type of benchmark identifies the levels of initial emissions charges and growth rates
required to hold the projected climate impact within some specified bound. For example, the U.S.
government’s Climate Change Science Program directed certain research institutions to determine
the carbon prices required to achieve several different stabilization scenarios, ranging from 450
ppm to 750 ppm of CO2 in the atmosphere. Under certain assumptions, these concentrations
correspond to different levels of change in the global mean temperature relative to pre-industrial
times, ranging from 1.5 to 3 degrees. Stabilization at 450 ppm implies an extremely aggressive
level of emissions control relative to current economic activity—far more aggressive than what is
contained in the Kyoto Protocol by even those countries making a commitment to act. The 550
ppm is also very aggressive relative to current economic activity. MIT’s Joint Program on the
Science and Policy of Global Change estimated the level of carbon tax required to achieve each of
these scenarios, and the points corresponding to their estimates are charted as the red squares in
Figure 5. The MIT analyses are based on a policy scenario whereby all nations apply the same tax
on CO2 emissions and this tax rises at a constant rate of 4% per year. The various stabilization
levels then imply different initial-year prices for the resulting trajectory to achieve the particular
goal. The analysis yields prices starting at anywhere from a low initial tax rate of $4.31/t CO2 for
the 750 ppm scenario to a high initial tax rate of $53.82/t CO2 for the 450 ppm scenario. This last
scenario lies outside to the right of the scale of Figure 5.
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6. Conclusions
The decision about what type of technology to select for current investments in new power
plants clearly depends upon conjectures about future regulations of carbon. Electric utilities
cannot simply assume that because there are currently no carbon regulations, therefore the
apparently cheaper PC technology maximizes shareholder value. The choice of a technology for
such a long-lived capital investment is a standard decision under uncertainty. If there is sufficient
probability that stringent carbon emission regulations will be imposed sometime in the future,
then the IGCC technology becomes the most profitable choice.
We have characterized the key economic parameters of the two technologies, and we have
made assumptions about the other key economic variables—notably the cost of fuel and the
discount rate. We then identified exactly how different levels of future carbon regulations shifted
the calculus between the PC and the IGCC technologies. The choice then requires an assessment
of the likelihood of different levels of penalty for emissions under future regulation. We
presented the range of possible future levels of regulation in a simple matrix and presented some
useful benchmarks.
The matrix in Figure 5 presents a striking picture of the range of widely discussed scenarios
for future regulation against the set of scenarios for which investment in new IGCC plants is
warranted. Few of the widely discussed scenarios fall within the space where IGCC is less
costly. Under most of the widely discussed scenarios the PC technology remains the least costly.
The level of future regulation required to justify a current investment in the IGCC technology
appears to be very aggressive, if not out of the question.
A final interesting benchmark against which to view this critical decision is the price at which
carbon emissions allowances are currently trading in the European Union’s Emission Trading
System (ETS). Recent (July 2005) prices in the ETS have been in the range of $27.3/t CO2
($100/t C). If these actual prices in Europe are any guide to possible levels of charges under
future U.S. regulations, then looking back at Figure 5, this clearly argues in favor of the selection
of the IGCC technology. A number of analysts, however, suggest that the current price in this
new market should not be given too much credence—that it is not a good guide to the future
price. Economic modeling of the commitments under the Protocol and the costs of compliance
across various industries suggests a price less than $1/t CO2—see Reilly & Paltsev (2005) and
also Babiker et al. (2002), Manne & Richels (2001), Nordhaus (2001), Den Elzen & de Moor
(2001) and Bohringer (2001). But this conjecture has yet to be borne out.
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APPENDIX
In Section 5 we quoted various benchmark levels of a carbon emissions charge and annual growth
rate. These benchmarks are also shown in Figure 5. As noted in footnote 9 above, “We quote all figures
here in terms that are comparable to the other numbers used in this paper—i.e., emissions charges for
2015, denominated in 2003 dollars, and quoted as $/t CO2. Where figures quoted in the original sources
are benchmarked in different years, denominated in dollars quoted in a different year, or quoted as $/t C
instead of CO2, we show our calculations in the Appendix.” This Appendix provides those calculations,
taking the figures from the original source and producing the figures quoted here.
Nordhaus & Boyer (2000). We use the figures in their Table 8.5 on p. 133 showing an optimal policy with
an initial carbon tax of $12.7/t C, growing annually at a rate 2.34%. Putting the initial cost figure into
the same terms as the cash flow figures we have been using yields an estimated compliance cost of
$4.1/t CO2 growing annually at a rate 2.28%. This is done as follows.
Growth Rate: {ln ([$31.64/t C]/[$12.71/t C])}/(2055–2015) = 2.28% per year.
2015 CO2 Price in 2003$: ($12.71/t C)/[3.67 (t C/t CO2)] x (138.1/116.3) = $4.1/t CO2.
(Producer Price Index data: 2003PPI = 138.1, 1990PPI = 116.3)
McCain-Lieberman. Paltsev et al. (2003), p. 20, Table 6 showed a cost in 2015 of approximately $10/t CO2
rising to a cost in 2020 of $13/t CO2, reported in 1997 dollars. This translates to an annualized growth
rate of 5.25%. The calculations of the real growth rates and 2015 CO2 price in 2003$ is as follows.
Growth Rate: {ln [($13/t CO2)/($10/t CO2)]}/(2020–2015) = 5.25% per year.
2015 CO2 Price in 2003$: ($10/t CO2) x (138.1/127.6) = $10.82/t CO2. (1997PPI = 127.6)
The National Commission on Energy Policy (2004) proposed emissions caps that they estimated would
yield a price of $5/t CO2 in 2010 and $7/t CO2 in 2020, both denominated in 2004 dollars. This implies
a real annual growth rate of 3.4%. Translating 2004 dollars to 2003 dollars using realized inflation
figures, and then calculating the price in 2015 yields a $5.57/t CO2 figure. The calculations of the real
growth rates and 2015 CO2 price in 2003$ is as follows. (2004PPI = 146.7)
Growth Rate: {ln [($7/t CO2)/($5/t CO2)]}/(2020–2010) = 3.36% per year.
2015 CO2 Price in 2003$: ($5/t CO2) x [(1+3.36%)
(2015–2010)] x (138.1/146.7) = $5.55/t CO2.
Barnes (2001). The safety valve was set at initial cost of $25/t C starting in 2003. Translating this to a rate
per ton CO2, and then translating 2001 dollars to 2003 dollars using realized inflation figures yields the
$7/t CO2 figure. The calculations of the 2015 CO2 price in 2003$ is as follows. (2001PPI = 134.2)
2015 CO2 Price in 2003$: {($25/t C)/[3.67 (t C/t CO2)]} x (138.1/134.2) = $7.01/t CO2.
Kopp et al. (2001). This corresponds to a compliance payment of $50/t C. Translating this payment to a
rate per ton CO2, and then translating 1995 dollars to 2003 dollars using realized inflation figures yields
the $16.2/t CO2 figure. A real annual growth rate of 2.34% has been assumed for this price starting
2015. The calculation of the 2015 CO2 price in 2003$ is as follows. (1995PPI = 116.3)
2015 CO2 Price in 2003$: {($50/t C)/[3.67 (t C/t CO2)]} x (138.1/116.3) = $16.18/t CO2.
MIT stabilization scenarios. The forthcoming report provides carbon prices starting in 2010 and growing at
4% per year. These prices are denominated in 1997 dollars. We take the 2010 prices, grow them at 4%
per year, compounded, to give the carbon price in 2015. We then translate this to a price for CO2 by
dividing by 3.67. Finally, we translate this to 2003 dollars by multiplying by the ratio of the 2003 PPI to
the 1997 PPI, 138.1/127.6.
Stabilization Carbon Price in Specified Year
Scenario (ppm) 2010 ($/t C) (1997$) 2015 ($/t C) (1997$) 2015 ($/t CO2) (1997$) 2015 ($/t CO2) (2003$)
750 12.00 14.60 3.98 4.31
650 20.00 24.33 6.63 7.18
550 40.00 48.67 13.26 14.35
450 150.00 182.50 49.73 53.82
.
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